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States Supreme Court, which, in reviewing cases from a state court,
takes judicial notice of everything that a state court would notice. Han-
ley v. Donoghue, n16 U.S. 1, 6 S. Ct. 242, 29 Law Ed. 535 (1885).
It must be admitted, however, that it may be a more difficult matter for
a court to find an ordinance not contained in the record than it is for
the Federal Court to ascertain the statutes of the various states.
It would seem that the view of the jurisdictions refusing to take
judicial notice is based largely on an argument of convenience, the saving
of time and labor of the court that would be required in a search for
the ordinance. The contrary view has certain logical support in holding
that a reviewing court will notice a municipal ordinance if the trial
court was compelled to do so. It is submitted, that the principal case, in
following the latter view, reached the more desirable result.
MAURICE A. YOUNG
INSURANCE
MISSTATEMENT OF AGENT IN APPLICATION WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF INSURED
The plaintiff was solicited by an agent of the defendant insurance
company to take out a health, accident and life policy. The company
wrote no such policies on persons over 49 years of age. There is no
evidence that the insured knew of this. The plaintiff truthfully told
the agent that he was between 58 and 62 years of age, but the agent
fraudulently had the policy issued with the insured designated as being
49 years of age. The policy was delivered to the insured and contained
the above statement. The insured was illiterate and could only read
"a little." The company later cancelled the policy after having paid
two sick benefits. The plaintiff seeks to recover all premiums paid less
amounts paid as sick benefits. Held: That the plaintiff could not re-
cover his premiums as the company had no power to avoid the policy;
that the soliciting agent was the agent of the company by virtue both
of G.C. Sec. 9407 and of the common law principle that it embodies.
McSwain v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 49 O.A. 342, 3 0.0.
231, 197 N.E. 253 (i934).
It is well settled that a soliciting agent is the agent of the insurer.
Roth v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 123 Neb. 300, 242 N.W. 612
(1932); Van Ross v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Kan. 478, 7 P
(2d) 41 1932); National Life and dccident Ins. Co. of Tenn. v.
Sneed, 4o Ga. App. 131, 149 S.E. 68 (1929); and this is true, ac-
cording to the weight of authority, although it is provided in the policy
that he is the agent of the insured. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v.
.drenbrust, Farahan and Loran, 85 Cal. App. 263, 259 P. 121 (927);
Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 17o N.Y. 13, 62 N.E. 763,
88 Am. St. Rep. 625, 57 L.R.A. 318 (1902); Vance, "Law of In-
surance" (2nd ed. 1930), pp. 414, 439-443, 447- This is so whether
the agent be the soliciting agent, Brady Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Smith,
76 S.W. (2d.) 231 (Texas 1934); Webber v. Mass. Bonding and
Ins. Co., 8x Mont. 351, 263 P. 101 (1928); Inter-Ocean Casualty
Co. v. Brown, 31 S.W. (2d) 333 (Texas, 1930), or the medical ex-
aminer. Lindstrom v. Nat. Life Ins. Co. of U. S. 84 Or. 588, I65 P.
675 (1917); Wesguth v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 194 Ill. App.
17 (1915), affirmed, 272 fll. 541, 12 N.E. 350 (1916). In Ohio,
G.C. Sec. 9407 specifically provides that in all controversies between
an insurance company and the insured the soliciting agent is the agent
of the company. Therefore, where the soliciting agent or the medical
examiner, having true knowledge of the facts, sends in a false answer,
the knowledge of the agent is that of the company. Roth v. Employers'
Fire Ins. Co., supra; Van Ross v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra;
Brady Mutual Life Ins. Iss'n v. Smith, supra.
If there has been collusion between the insured and the agent, in the
absence of statute, the uniform holding is that the knowledge of the
agent cannot be imputed to the insurer, as the utmost good faith is re-
quired. First National Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ford, 141 So. 719
(Ala. 1932); Peoria Life Ins. Co. v. Haenelt, 46 Fed, (2d.) 173
(D.C., Tex., 1930); 4ldler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 Fed.
(2d) 827 (C.C.A., Ark., 1929); Iyers v. Business Men's Ins. Co.,
148 S.C. 355, 146 S.E. 147 (1928); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.
v. Spears, 219 Ky. 681, 294 S.W. 138 (1927).
Ohio, by express statutory provision, G.C. Sec. 9391, has repudiated
the common law rule and it has been held that even though there be
collusion between the insured and the agent to defraud the company,
the insured may recover. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kilbane, 15 C.C. 62,
8 C.D. 790 (1897). The statute provides that no answer in an inter-
rogatory shall bar the right to recover, or be used in evidence in any
suit, upon the policy issued thereon unless the answer be proved to be
wilfully false, fradulently made, that it is material, that it induced the
company to issue the policy and also that the agent or company have no
knowledge of the falsity or fraud of such statement. This statute has
ben held to apply to answers to interrogatories in the application, but
not to apply to conditions in the policy itself. Insurance Co. v. Howle,
62 O.S. 204, 56 N.E. 908, 43 W.L.B. 320 (1900).
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In the principal case the general holding is in accord with the weight
of authority. The dictum in the case to the effect that had there been
collusion between the insured and the agent, the former could not re-
cover, can be reconciled with the above statute, although the court
makes no mention of it, as the age provision in this case was probably
such a condition as to take the case out of the statute.
CARL R. BULLOCK
SUIT By MORTGAGEE, AFTER FORECLOSURE, ON A POLICY
WITH THE USUAL MORTGAGE CLAUSE
The plaintiff was a mortgagee of real property which was insured
by the mortgagor under a fire insurance policy which contained the New
York standard mortgage clause stating that in case of loss payment was
to be made to the mortgagee as its interest might appear and that this
interest should not be invalidated by any act of foreclosure or other pro-
ceedings or notice of sale relating to the property. The house burned
down and thereafter the plaintiff foreclosed and became the purchaser
of the property under the mortgage. Subsequently, the plaintiff brought
an action against the insurance company. Held. The mortgagee had no
cause of action on the fire insurance policy. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Baldwi~n
County Building & Loan .iss'n., 163 So. 604 (Ala. 1935).
This case was tried on an agreed statement of facts and there was no
showing that the plaintiff either had notice of the loss at the time it
occurred, or at the time of the foreclosure sale. The attitude of the
Alabama Court was that the plaintiff was not injured and that it had
already received, through foreclosure, all that could ordinarily be ex-
pected from the mortgage transaction. However, if the value of the
property in its present depreciated state is not equal to the amount of the
mortgage debt plus the interest due thereon, the plaintiff is bound to
suffer a loss. Such an injury is the very loss against which the defendant
Insurance Company agreed to insure the mortgagee. Perretta v. St.
Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 177 N.Y. Supp. 923, 188 A.D. 998 (1919);
Seccombe v. Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 611, 188 Pac. 305
(1920). See, also, Couch on Insurance, Vol. 5, P- 4405-
A contract of insurance has been defined as, "A contract whereby,
for an agreed premium, one party undertakes to compensate the other
for loss on a specified subject by specified perils." This is the definition
set forth in State ex rel. Sheets v. Pittsburgh, Cinn., Chicago, and St.
Louis.Ry., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N.E. 93 (903); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co.
v. Cochran, 1O4 Ohio St. 427, 135 N.E. 37 (1922); and is substan-
